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INTERNATIONAL DOUBLE TAXATION, THE
FOREIGN PARENT CASE: BARCLAYS BANK V
FRANCHISE TAX BD. OF CALIFORNIA
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Constitution grants the power to regulate foreign and
interstate commerce to Congress,' and the Import-Export Clause provides that
"no State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties
on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing
it's [sic] inspection Laws ... 2 Yet, the Supreme Court has held that state
governments have a legitimate right to collect taxes for the services they provide
to corporations conducting business within the states' borders.3 However, state
governments cannot tax value earned outside their borders.'
At issue is the methodology that the states may use to divide the income of
the corporation so that value earned outside of the state's borders is not taxed.
The Federal Government endorses the arm's length method which is also used
by the international community.5  This method treats each corporation, even
those closely affiliated, as independent entities dealing at arm's length, and treats
the transactions between the affiliates as reflecting fair market value.6
The States insist this method is inherently flawed and have developed the
apportionment method.7 This method is based upon the theory that there are
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The Commerce Clause provides that "the Congress shall have Power
... to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States." Id
2. U.S. CONST. art. I., § 10, cl. 2.
3. Dep't. of Revenue, Wash. v. Ass'n of Wash. Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. 734, 750 (1978); Complete
Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977); General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436 (1964);
Northwestern Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959); Memphis Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U.S. 80 (1948);
Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444-45 (1940).
4. ASARCO Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 458 U.S. 307, 315 (1982); See also Connecticut General
Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77, 80-81 (1938).
5. Brief of Petitioner at 4, Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd. of California, _ U.S. _.._, 114
S. Ct. 2268 (1994) (No. 92-1384).
6. Barclays Bank Int'l, Ltd. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 829 P.2d 279, 282 (Cal. 1992).
7. Id. at 282-83.
These critics cite several shortcomings in the AL/SA method: comparative distortions in measuring
income, and a resulting overtaxation or undertaxation; administrative complexity generated by the
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many intrinsic flows of value between the affiliates of a corporation that cannot
be measured.8 For example, California's method aggregates the profit of
affiliated corporations, even those outside the state's jurisdiction, with that of the
entity that is conducting business within the state, and then apportions that
income on the basis of a formula.9
California's method has been specifically supported by the courts. In 1983,
the Supreme Court expressly upheld this method as constitutional when applied
to a domestic parent corporation with foreign subsidiaries.'l However, the
Court specifically declined to decide whether this method would pass constitu-
tional scrutiny if applied to a domestic corporation with a foreign parent or a
foreign corporation with either a foreign parent or foreign subsidiaries." In
June 1994, the Supreme Court faced this very question and rendered its answer
in Barclays Bank v. Franchise Tax Bd. of California. The majority concluded
that Barclays' objection to the California method was directed to the "wrong
forum." 13 The Court relied on its analysis in prior decisions and underscored
its position that Congress may passively indicate that a state may take a
particular course of action.'
4
This casenote will provide a basic understanding of the state and federal
methods used to apportion a corporation's income for tax purposes in part H..
Part Il will then explore in detail the most relevant underpinnings of the Court's
jurisprudence in the Barclays Bank decision. Finally, parts IV and V will
provide an analytical framework in which to define the Court's decision in
Barclays Bank and will look at the impact the decision will have on multination-
al corporations and the United States.
II. THE CENTER OF THE CONTROVERSY
A. State vs. Federal Requirements
There are essentially two methods by which sovereigns may tax the income
of a multijurisdictional corporation. 5  They are the arm's length/separate
accounting (AL/SA) method, and the unitary business/formula apportionment
method. The United States, the United Kingdom, and most other nations of the
need to analyze thousands of intercorporate transactions; and the common absence of uncontrolled
comparable prices by which to verify the value of intercorporate "arms length" transactions.
Id.
8. Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 164-65 (1983).
9. Barclays Bank Int'l, Ltd., 829 P.2d at 282 n.2. See infra note 47 for California's three-factor variant
of formula apportionment.
10. Container Corp. of Ar., 463 U.S. at 184.
11. Id. at 189, n.26.
12. Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., _ U.S. _, 114 S. Ct. 2268 (1994), affg 10 Cal. App.
4th 1742 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
13. Id. at 2285-86 (stating that it was Congress, not the judiciary, who should determine federal policy
concerning the state's method of taxation).
14. Id. at 2282-83. See generally Itel Containers Int'l Corp. v. Huddleston, _ U.S. _, 113 S. Ct. 1095
(1993); Wardair Canada, Inc. v. Florida Dep't of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1 (1986); Container Corp. of Am. v.
Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159 (1983).
15. Barclays Bank Int'l, Ltd. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 829 P.2d 279, 282 (Cal. 1992).
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world have adopted the ALISA method. 16 ALJSA treats each corporation as an
independent entity dealing at arm's length with its affiliates.1 7  The internal
accounting records of the corporation determine the income attributable to that
jurisdiction.'" In contrast, most states have adopted the unitary busi-
ness/formula apportionment method. 9 Some states, such as California, have
adopted a variant of the formula apportionment method called the worldwide
combined reporting method (WWCR). 2' WWCR aggregates the income of all
entities that form a part of a unitary business, regardless of the jurisdiction in
which they do business, then determines the taxing jurisdiction's share according
to a formula.2'
The fundamental difference between the AUSA approach and the unitary
business formula, or more specifically the WWCR, is their basic assumption.
The AL/SA method recognizes that costs, values, and profits can vary
significantly among countries.' The WWCR method is based on the assump-
tion that there is an unquantifiable transfer of value that takes place among the
affiliates of a corporation.23
The State Department acknowledged that the WWCR has provoked intense
criticism from foreign sovereigns. On one hand, the United States, through
its treaties, is bound to follow the AL/SA method. While conversely, the
individual states may impose a completely different method of computing a
foreign corporation's tax liability for state tax purposes.
B. What is a Unitary Business?
The foundation of a state's apportionment method is defining the various
affiliates of a corporation as unitary. If a state's tax board deems the various
affiliated corporations to be part of a unitary group, then the affiliates' income
is apportioned to the taxing jurisdiction and includes the income of those
affiliates operating wholly outside the jurisdiction.' The rationale of the
unitary business concept is that a multijurisdictional corporation benefits from
contributions to income resulting from integration, centralization of management,
and economies of scale.26 Cases defining what constitutes a "unitary business"
16. Brief of Petitioner at 4, Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd. of California, _ U.S. _ 114
S. Ct. 2268 (1994) (No. 92-1384).
17. Barclays Bank Int'l, Ltd., 829 P.2d at 282.
18. Container Corp. of An, 463 U.S. at 185.
19. Barclays Bank Int'l, Ltd., 829 P.2d at 282-83.
20. Id. The three-factor model uses a mathematical formula based upon an averaged ratio of property,
payroll, and sales in the taxing jurisdiction to that of the unitary enterprise overall. For the formula see infra
note 47.
21. Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 165 (1983).
22. Brief of Petitioner at 5, Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd. of California,- U.S. - 114
S. Ct. 2268 (1994) (No. 92-1384).
23. See generally ASARCO Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 458 U.S. 307, 317 (1982); Mobil Oil Corp.
v. Comm'r of Taxes of Vermont, 445 U.S. 425, 438-42 (1980).
24. Brief of Petitioner at 7, Barclays Bank PLC (No. 92-1384).
25. Barclays Bank Int'l, Ltd. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 10 Cal. App. 4th 1742, 1748 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
26. Barclays Bank Int'l, Ltd. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 829 P.2d 279, 282 (Cal. 1992).
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are riddled with various definitions, and the Supreme Court has refused to apply
a "bright-line" test."
Butler Bros. v. McColgan28 was the first case decided by the Supreme
Court that addressed the issue of whether separate entities of a corporation were
sufficiently related to form a unitary business.29 In Butler Bros., the taxpayer
was an Illinois corporation which operated wholesale distributing houses in seven
states including California.30  Each house inter alia maintained its own sales
force, served its own sales territory, and kept its own accounting records. 3'
However, the corporation maintained a central buying division, and the affiliates
absorbed the actual cost of operating this division.32
The California house filed its tax return showing a net loss of $82,85 1.33
However, California imposed a franchise tax on an apportionment basis taking
into account the profits earned by the affiliated houses.34  Butler Bros.
contended the houses were in fact separate, and the California tax should not
include these affiliated houses. 35  The Court dismissed this argument, pointing
out that there existed unity of ownership and management.36 In reaching this
conclusion, the Court emphasized that the existence of the centralized buying
division alone provided evidence of integration. 37  Accordingly, the Court held
that California could appropriate its tax from the total unitary income on an
apportionment basis.38
Along the same line, the Supreme Court has concluded that a unitary
business exists when there is some exchange of value beyond the mere flow of
funds arising out of passive investment.39 Therefore, a corporation must
provide evidence that the activities of the affiliate are a part of a distinct and
discrete enterprise to prove that it is not part of a unitary business.'
27. Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 178 (1983). The Court refused to adopt
the corporation's argument that would have restricted the unitary test to a "flow of goods." Id.
28. 315 U.S. 501 (1942).
29. Id., The unitary business concept was first applied to a foreign corporation in Bass, Ratcliff &
Gretton, Ltd. v. Tax Comm'n, 266 U.S. 271 (1924).
30. Butler Bros., 315 U.S. at 504. The branch office in California maintained its own inventory, had its
own sales force, serviced only its own territory, and kept separate accounting records. However, the cost of
operating the Illinois office was absorbed by all branches. Moreover, the Illinois office purchased all inventory
and directed its shipment to the branch offices. Id
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 505.
34. Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 315 U.S. 501, 505 (1942).
35. Id. at 504-06.
36. Id. at 508.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 509.
39. Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 166 (1983). This flow of value may be
in the form of contribution to income between the entities. "[A] relevant question in the unitary business
inquiry is whether contributions to income (of the subsidiaries] result[ed] from functional integration,
centralization of management, and economies of scale." Id. at 179 (quoting F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Taxation
and Revenue Dep't, 458 U.S. 354, 364 (1982) (quoting Mobil Oil Corp. v. Comm'r of Taxes of Vermont, 445
U.S. 425, 438 (1980))).
40. Mobil Oil Corp., 445 U.S. at 439-40.
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The most recent enumeration of what constitutes a unitary business was
enunciated in Allied Signal, Inc. v. Director, Div. of Taxation.41 The Court
provided that the distinguishing characteristics of a unitary business are
functional integration, centralization of management, and economies of scale.42
Similarly, the Court has classified affiliates as unitary if their business exhibits:
(1) unity of ownership; (2) unity of operation as evidenced by central purchasing,
advertising, accounting and management division; and (3) unity of use of its
centralized executive force and general system of operation.43
It is apparent that the Court has varied in its determination of "unitary," and
thus, states may use their own definition of what constitutes a unitary business.
The Supreme Court has stated that it will not review every state court
determination de novo." Rather, if the state court applied the appropriate
standards and its conclusion "was within the realm of permissible judgment," the
Supreme Court will defer to the state court's determination. 45
For a higher court to overturn the state court's determination, the
corporation must show by "clear and cogent" evidence that the state's
determination was erroneous. 6  Thus, this is an area that is highly fact
intensive. It can also be deduced that the very underpinning of a state's use of
formula apportionment is defining a business as unitary. As a result, the
importance of this preliminary issue cannot be overemphasized.
C. What is Formula Apportionment?
After concluding that affiliated corporations are unitary, the state may then
apportion the income of all affiliated corporations, and then they may tax this
apportioned income. The formula apportionment method is based on a
mathematical equation designed to approximate taxable income of a multijuris-
dictional corporation.47 The Supreme Court held that the fundamental basis of
41. Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, _ U.S. __ 112 S. Ct. 2251 (1992).
42. Id. at 2264; See also Container Corp. of Am., 463 U.S. at 179 (quoting F.W. Woolworth Co., 458 U.S.
at 364 (quoting Mobil Oil Corp., 445 U.S. at 438)).
43. Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 315 U.S. 501 (1941).
44. Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 176 (1983); compare ASARCO Inc. v.
Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 458 U.S. 307 (1982) (subsidiaries determined to be passive investments); with F.W.
Woolworth Co. v. Taxation and Revenue Dep't, 458 U.S. 354 (1982) (Court denied state's attempt to include
all income because subsidiaries each operated a discrete business enterprise).
45. Container Corp. of Am., 463 U.S. at 176 (citing Norton v. Dep't of Revenue, 340 U.S. 534 (1951)).
46. Norfolk Western R. Co. v. North Carolina ex rel. Maxwell, 297 U.S. 682,688 (1936); see also Allied-
Signal, Inc. v. Director, Div. of Taxation,_ U.S. ., 112 S. Ct. 2251, 2260 (1992); Container Corp. of Am.,
463 U.S. at 475; Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207, 221-22 (1980); Butler Bros., 315
U.S. at 507.
47. California uses a three factor apportionment variant of formula apportionment and the taxable income
would be calculated as follows:
In-state In-state In-state
Property + Payroll + Sales
Total Total Total Total Income
Property Payroll Sales x Corporate = Taxable
3 Income by the state
Barclays Bank Int.l, Ltd. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 829 P.2d 279, 282 n.2. (Cal. 1992).
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state taxation is that "a state may not tax value earned outside its borders."'
Theoretically, if all jurisdictions were to impose the same apportionment method,
the states would tax no more than all of the unitary business' income.49
However, when a corporation does business in different jurisdictions, providing
accurate territorial allocations of taxable income to the state is a complex
matter."0 As a result, the Court has held that states may use various methods
to calculate the value earned inside its borders.5'
Methods of formula apportionment are problematic and can lead to gross
distortions of income. Therefore, if the taxpayer can prove by "clear and cogent
evidence" that the state is taxing income out of the appropriate proportion, or has
"led to a grossly distorted result," then the Court will overrule the application of
the apportionment formula. 2 In Container Corp., the Court recognized that the
three-factor formula apportionment scheme used by California has an inherent
margin of error.53  Nevertheless, the Court reasoned the error was within an
acceptable "substantial margin of error" inherent in any method of attributing
income among the components of a unitary business. 4
As noted above, states such as California apply the WWCR variant of
formula apportionment.5  Under this alternative, the state includes the
affiliate's income earned outside the state.56 The host state apportions the total
income of the unitary group by a three-factor formulaY.5  The three factors
consider property, payroll, and sales for the group in the host state as a fraction
of the total worldwide property, payroll, and sales. 58 The unitary group's total
income is multiplied by this fraction, producing an apportioned amount of
income taxable by the host state.5 9  The Supreme Court in Container Corp.
expressly upheld California's taxing scheme as applied to a domestic corporation.
However, it expressly reserved the issue of whether worldwide combined
reporting is constitutional when applied to a foreign taxpayer.
D. What is the Ann's Length Method?
The U.S. government and other national sovereigns use the arm's length
method to divide the tax base. Moreover, the United States and its trading
48. ASARCO Inc., 458 U.S. at 315.
49. Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., _ U.S. _ 114 S. Ct. 2268, 2277 (1994) (quoting
Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 169 (1983)).
50. Container Corp. of Am, 463 U.S. at 164. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Comm'r of Taxes of Vermont, 445
U.S. 425, 438 (1980); Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 315 U.S. 501, 507-09 (1941); Underwood Typewriter Co.
v. Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113, 121 (1920).
51. Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 445 (1940).
52. Container Corp. of Am., 463 U.S. at 170 (quoting Norfolk & Western R. Co. v. State Tax Comm'n,
390 U.S. 317, 326); see also Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 274 (1978).
53. Container Corp. of Am., 463 U.S. at 184.
54. Id. See also Moorman Mfg. Co., 437 U.S. at 272-73; Ford Motor Co. v. Beauchamp, 308 U.S. 331
(1939); Underwood Typewriter Co., 254 U.S. at 120-21.
55. Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., _ U.S. _ 114 S. Ct. 2268, 2272 (1994).
56. Barclays Bank lnt'l, Ltd. v. Franchise Tax Board, 829 P.2d 279, 282 (Cal. 1992).
57. Id. at 282.
58. Id.
59. Barclays Bank PLC, 114 S. Ct. at 2272. See supra note 46.
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partners use this method in all bilateral tax treaties and in their internal tax
laws.' Under the arm's length or separate accounting method, the sovereign
treats each corporate affiliate as a separate entity to determine income tax
liability.6" When a corporation does business outside the United States, the
United States as the host country taxes only the income earned within its borders
by that corporation.62 The host country does not tax income earned by the
corporation in other countries, nor does it tax income earned by affiliated
corporations in other countries.63 However, the Court has noted that a
corporation could possibly divert income to other jurisdictions with lower tax
rates by using creative accounting techniques.' To safeguard against such
manipulation, the corporation must conduct its business between the affiliated
groups on an "arm's length" basis, where the true market value of such
transactions are reported.65  If all transactions between the affiliates are
conducted on an "arm's length" basis, then the host state may tax only the
income reflected on the corporation's own books.'
E. The Pros and Cons of the State and Federal Methods
Corporations have argued that the WWCR method increases the total
apportionable income amount compared to the arm's length method.67 For
example, if the property values and wages in the jurisdiction outside the host
state are lower than that of the taxing jurisdiction, then the income of the
jurisdiction outside the state is higher.' The taxing jurisdiction in effect
receives a windfall. This windfall is due to a disproportionately large amount
of income being apportioned to the taxing state. As noted by the Supreme Court
in Container Corp., the WWCR method resulted in a fourteen percent difference
in the taxable income above the amount that it would have been had the
corporation used the arm's length method. 6
9
Conversely, States argue that the arm's length method fails to account for
contributions to income that result from "functional integration, centralization of
management, and economies of scale."70 Moreover, they argue that separate
accounting is subject to manipulation and imprecision which often ignores or
misrepresents the many subtle and unquantifiable transfers of value that take
place among the components of a single worldwide enterprise.7' With respect
to contentions of distortion which compare WWCR results with profit or loss
60. Brief of Petitioner at 4, Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd. of California, - U.S. _ 114
S. Ct. 2268 (1994) (No. 92-1384).
61. Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., _ U.S. ., 114 S. Ct. 2268, 2273 (1994).
62. Brief of Petitioner at 4, Barclays (No. 92-1384).
63. Id at 4.
64. Barclays Bank PLC, 114 S. Ct. at 2273.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 181-82 (1983); Barclays Bank PLC, 114
S. Ct. at 2279.
68. Id.
69. Container Corp. of Am., 463 U.S. at 184.
70. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Comn'r of Taxes of Vermont, 445 U.S. 425, 438 (1980).
71. Container Corp. of Am, 463 U.S. at 164-65.
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determinations made under AL/SA, the Court has dismissed this argument
reasoning that it is the basic theoretical weaknesses of AJJSA which justify
resorting to formula apportionment in the first place.72
ImI. THE PREVIOUS DECISIONS
A. Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles7 3
When determining whether a state tax is constitutional under the Dormant
Commerce Clause, the Court balances the need for the state to extract from
interstate commerce a fair share of the government's expenses without unduly
restricting the flow of interstate commerce. 74 The validity of a state tax, as
applied to domestic corporations under the Commerce Clause, is determined
according to a four-pronged test developed from Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v.
Brady.7  The tax on domestic corporations will be upheld if: (1) the tax is
applied to activities that have a substantial nexus with the taxing state; (2) the
tax is fairly apportioned; (3) the tax does not discriminate against interstate or
foreign commerce; and (4) the tax is fairly related to the service provided by the
state.
7 6
The four-pronged test is not adequate in all cases. In Japan Line, six
Japanese shipping companies operated vessels that carried large cargo shipping
containers.77 The ships, as well as the containers, were used exclusively in
foreign commerce.78 California sought to impose an ad valorem tax on any
container present within the jurisdiction on a certain date each year.79
However, the containers were already subject to property tax in Japan, and had
in fact been taxed there. 0 If the containers at issue were instrumentalities of
purely interstate commerce, the Court acknowledged Complete Auto's test would
be sustained, and its Commerce Clause analysis would end." However, the
containers were instrumentalities of foreign commerce, and therefore the Court
held that it was necessary to apply two additional considerations notwithstanding
the Complete Auto four prong test.8 2
The Court began its analysis noting that nondomiciliary states do have a
right to tax instrumentalities of commerce on an apportionment basis. However,
even though apportioned, the tax must not create an "enhanced risk of
international multiple taxation. ' '83 The Court recognized that when dealing with
domestic interstate commerce, the Constitution requires each state to apportion
72. Id. at 181.
73. 441 U.S. 434 (1979).
74. Id. at 444.
75. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
76. Id. at 279.
77. Japan Line, Ltd., 441 U.S. at 436.
78. Id. at 436.
79. Id. at 437.
80. Id. at 436.
81. Id. at 445.
82. Japan Line, Ltd., 441 U.S. at 445-46.
83. Id. at 446.
[Vol. 2:345
INTERNATIONAL DOUBLE TAXATION
the tax fairly to substantially reduce the risk of multiple taxation." But when
dealing in foreign commerce, the Federal Government cannot guarantee relief
from double taxation, even if taxes are fairly apportioned in the United States. 5
This result occurs because there is no single tribunal able to ensure that the total
aggregate tax is applied only once to the instrumentalities' full value.86
Because Japan had in fact taxed the containers at their full value, the Court
found California's levy necessarily resulted in double taxation and violated the
foreign Commerce Clause. 7 The Court rejected California's argument that the
resulting multiple taxation had been created by Japan, stating that the tax:
must be evaluated in the realistic framework of the custom of nations. Japan has
the right and the power to tax the appellant's containers at their full value; nothing
could prevent it from doing so... [t]his Court is powerless to correct malapportion-
ment of taxes imposed from abroad in foreign commerce.'
The Court then addressed whether state tax impaired federal uniformity. A
state tax must not impair federal uniformity or prevent "the Federal Government
from 'speaking with one voice when regulating commercial relations with foreign
governments'."89 The Court found that the imposition of the levy on cargo
containers used exclusively in international traffic frustrated this uniformity."
First, the Court relied on the Customs Convention on Containers9" to
establish the need for federal uniformity.92 The Court noted that Congress had
not "preempted the field by affirmative regulation," but the Court found that
where Congress had remained silent, the Court "under the commerce clause [is]
the final arbiter of the competing demands of state and national interests." 93
Thus, a multinational agreement may reflect a national policy to remove
impediments that disrupt the flow of international commerce. Second, since
Japan did not tax American-owned containers, the Court noted the asymmetry
created by the California tax. This asymmetry posed the risk of international
retaliation upon American owned instrumentalities present in the foreign
jurisdiction. 4 Finally, there was the possibility of subjecting foreign businesses
to varying degrees of multiple taxation that would make "speaking with one
84. Id. at 446-48.
85. Id. The country of domicile may impose a tax on the full value of an instrumentality of commerce,
and in the event that the state also seeks to apportion part of that value, then actual double taxation results.
Id.
86. Id. at 447-48.
87. Japan Line, Ltd., 441 U.S. at 451-52.
88. Id. at 454.
89. Id. at 451.
90. Id. at 452.
91. Customs Convention on Containers, May 18, 1956, U.S.-Japan, 20 U.S.T. 301, 304. The Customs
Convention on Containers is a multinational agreement between the United States and Japan. The agreement
provides for "temporary admission free of import duties and taxes and free of import prohibitions and
restrictions" if the containers are used solely in foreign commerce and are subject to re-exportation. Id. at 304.
92. Japan Line, Ltd., 441 U.S. at 452-53.
93. Id. at 454 (quoting Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona ex. rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 769 (1945)).
Accord Hughes v. Oklahoma 441 U.S. 322, 326 (1979); Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Comm'n, 429
U.S. 318, 328 (1977).
94. Japan Line, Ltd., 441 U.S. at 453.
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voice" impossible.9" In summarizing the Court's analysis, where foreign
commerce is concerned, "[e]ven a slight overlapping of a tax - a problem that
might be deemed de minimus in a domestic context - assumes importance when
sensitive matters of foreign relations and national sovereignty are concerned." '
B. Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Board'
Container involved a Delaware corporation headquartered in Illinois.
Container was a vertically integrated manufacturer of custom-ordered paperboard
packaging doing part of its business in California.98 It also controlled twenty
subsidiaries in Latin America and Europe with ownership ranging from 66.7%
to 100%. 99 Container had omitted all of its subsidiaries' payroll, property, and
sales, claiming that they were passive investments rather than part of a unitary
business."°  The California Franchise Tax Board disagreed and treated
Container Corp. and its subsidiaries as a unitary business applying the three-
factor apportionment formula. I"1 The Franchise Tax Board's determination had
increased Container's tax by 14%.m°
On appeal to the Supreme Court, Container initially argued that there had
been no flow of goods, and therefore it was not a unitary business.0 3 As
noted previously, the taxpayer has the burden of coming forth with "clear and
cogent evidence" that the state had taxed extraterritorial values." 4 Discounting
Appellant's argument, the Court stated the prerequisite to finding a unitary
business was not a flow of goods, but rather a "flow of value."'0"
In determining whether a "flow of value" existed in the instant case, the
essential inquiry was whether "contributions to income [of the subsidiaries]
result[ed] from functional integration, centralization of management, and
economies of scale."' 6 Here, the taxpayer assisted the subsidiaries in obtain-
ing equipment and personnel, assisted in obtaining financing, provided technical
assistance, and made use of the corporate executives.0 7 Thus, looking to the
facts taken as a whole, the Court concluded that the trial court's determination
of a unitary business was "within the realm of permissible judgment.""'
Container then argued that California's taxing scheme violated the
constitutional requirement of fair apportionment, " contending that the
differences between the United States and other national economies distorted the
95. Id. at 450-55.
96. Id. at 456.
97. 463 U.S. 159 (1983).
98. Id. at 171.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 174-75.
101. Container Corp. of Am., 463 U.S. at 174-75.
102. Id. at 184.
103. Id. at 178-80.
104. Id. at 175.
105. Id.
106. Container Corp. of Am., 463 U.S. at 178-79 (quoting Mobil Oil Corp., 445 U.S. at 438).
107. Id. at 172-73.
108. Id. at 180.
109. Id at 181-88.
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apportionment formula and misappropriated income to the taxing jurisdic-
tion.10 Container attempted to support its argument by stating that its
subsidiaries were significantly more profitable. Thus, if California were to rely
on the indirect measures of income, (payroll, property, and sales) then this three-
factor formula systematically distorted the true allocation of income between the
separate entities."' The Court found this argument without merit and sum-
marily dismissed it by stating, "the profit figures relied on by [Container] are
based on precisely the sort of formal geographical accounting whose basic
theoretical weaknesses justify resorting to formula apportionment in the first
place.""l
2
Container then argued that because wages were lower in the jurisdictions
outside California, the use of the formula unfairly inflated the amount of income
apportioned to the United States operation."3  The Court dismissed this
argument by noting that the three-factor formula used by California was
"necessarily imperfect."".4  The Court distinguished the amount of distortion
caused in Container's case of 14%, and that of more than 250% in Hans Rees'
Sons, Inc., where the Court struck down that state's method of apportion-
ment." 5 Accordingly, the Court believed the fourteen percent distortion was
"within the substantial margin of error in any method of attributing income
among the components of a unitary business.""' 6
Considering the additional requirements of the Japan Line test, Container
argued that California's tax had violated the Foreign Commerce Clause by
exposing it to an enhanced risk of multiple taxation." 7 The Court began its
analysis by recognizing four similarities between Japan Line and Container
Corp.: 1) both taxpayers had been subjected to actual double taxation; 2) this
double taxation stemmed from the differences in the taxing methods adopted by
California and the foreign taxing jurisdiction; 3) the taxing schemes used by the
foreign jurisdiction were consistent with those of international practice; and 4)
that the Federal Government had expressed a preference for the arm's length
method as opposed to the apportionment formula adopted by California."8
Notwithstanding these similarities, the Court determined that the unitary method
applied by California passed constitutional scrutiny under the test reiterated in
Japan Line."9 Distinguishing the facts involved in Japan Line from the facts
involved in Container, the Court noted that Japan Line involved a property tax
rather than an income tax.' 2° Moreover, the existing double taxation was "not
the inevitabl[e] result of the California taxing scheme."''
110. Id. at 181.
111. Container Corp. of Am., 463 U.S. at 181.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 181-82.
114. Id. at 183.
115. Id. (citing Hans Rees' Sons, Inc. v. North Carolina ex rel. Maxwell, 283 U.S. 123 (1931)).
116. Container Corp. of Am., 463 U.S. at 184.
117. Id. at 185-88.
118. Id. at 186-90.
119. Id. at 189-92.
120. Container Corp. of Am., 463 U.S. at 187-88.
121. Id. at 189.
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In Japan Line, the Court stated the result of the property tax would
necessarily result in double taxation, but here, the Court reasoned that double
taxation on income would depend upon the facts of the case. The Court
concluded that Foreign Commerce analysis must consider "the context in which
the double taxation takes place and the alternatives reasonably available to the
taxing State.' ' 122 Adopting the arm's length method would not necessarily
eliminate double taxation.1 23
In Japan Line, California could avoid double taxation by simply not taxing
any property used exclusively in international commerce. The Court found this
equitable because it reflected international practice and express federal
policy. 4 However, in Container Corp. the income was in part domestic, and
the Court believed it absurd to prohibit California from taxing the state's fair
portion of the income earned within California's borders.1 25 Even if California
adopted some version of the arm's length approach, it would not necessarily
eliminate double taxation. The Court remarked that the difference between a tax
on income and a tax on tangible property suggests the different result reached
in Container.26 Instead of evaluating the apportionment formula on its own
merits, the Court rationalized its decision as follows: "it would be perverse,
simply for the sake of avoiding double taxation, to require California to give up
one allocation method that sometimes results in double taxation, in favor of
another allocation method that also sometimes results in double taxation."'2 7
Turning to the second prong of the Japan Line test, the Court reiterated that
a tax "may [not] impair federal uniformity in an area where federal uniformity
is essential and prevent the Federal Government from 'speaking with one voice'
in international trade."'' 28 In conducting this analysis, the Court stated that it
could not be inferred that the tax policies of the Federal Government mandate
identical treatment by the states, unless there was some explicit directive from
Congress. 129 Thus, the one voice standard will be violated if there are foreign
policy issues that must be left to the Federal Government or if the state's taxing
scheme violates a clear mandate from the Federal Government. 30
In addressing the issue of whether there was some 'clear mandate' from
Congress, the Court emphasized "Congress has long debated, but has not
enacted, legislation designed to regulate state taxation of income."' 3' As a
result of Congress' inaction, the Court reasoned that this taxing scheme was not
122. Id. at 190.
123. Id. at 192.
124. Japan Line, Ltd., 441 U.S. at 444.
125. Container Corp. of Am., 463 U.S. at 191.
126. Id. at 190. See also Mobil Oil Corp., 445 U.S. at 444-46; Exxon Corp., 447 U.S. at 228-29; cf Japan
Line, Ltd., 441 U.S. at 447.
127. Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 194; cf. Moorman Mfg. Co., 437 U.S. at 278-90.
128. Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 193-94 (quoting Japan Line, Ltd., 441 U.S. at 448-53 (quoting Michelin
Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 285 (1976))).
129. Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 195 (quoting Mobil Oil Corp., 445 U.S. at 448); See also Japan Line,
Ltd. 441 U.S. at 456 n.20; Michelin Tire Corp., 423 U.S. at 286.
130. Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 194.
131. Id. at 196-97 (quoting Mobil Oil Corp., 445 U.S. at 448).
[Vol. 2:345
INTERNATIONAL DOUBLE TAXATION
fatally inconsistent with federal policy. 32 Notwithstanding Congress' failure
to legislate, the Court felt that it was incompetent to adjudicate in policy matters
dealing with the threat of foreign retaliation. Nevertheless, it developed three
general objective standards by which to balance these foreign policy issues.13
The Court dismissed this threat of international retaliation noting: (1) the tax did
not create "automatic asymmetry" in international taxation; (2) the tax was
technically imposed on a domestic corporation rather than a foreign entity; (3)
Container is a domestic corporation that is no doubt amenable to taxation in
California; and (4) the tax at issue is more a function of California's tax rate
than of its allocation method. 34 Accordingly, the Court upheld California's
formula apportionment method as applied to domestic corporations with foreign
subsidiaries.
C. Wardair Canada, Inc., v. Florida Dep't of Revenue135
Wardair Canada, Inc. is a Canadian corporation which operated round-trip
international airline charter flights between Canada and the United States. 136
During the years in issue, the Florida Department of Revenue assessed an excise
tax on fuel purchased within the state, regardless of whether the airline consumed
the fuel purchased in intrastate or interstate flights. 37 Wardair expended the
fuel purchased in Florida exclusively in foreign commerce. 31 Wardair
challenged, stating that the Dormant Commerce Clause precluded the tax, and
that the tax had violated the "one voice standard" reiterated in Japan Line. 39
Additionally, Wardair maintained the state tax violated the Supremacy Clause of
the Constitution.Y It was Wardair's position that the Federal Government,
through the Federal Aviation Act, had so pervasively occupied the field that the
Act preempted all state regulation. 14' However, the Court found Congress had:
(1) expressly provided for the state's tax; (2) by "negative implication" expressed
an intent not to preempt the field; and (3) not remained silent, and thus did not
trigger Dormant Commerce Clause analysis or the application of the "one voice"
standard. 142
The Court first addressed Wardair's Supremacy Clause challenge. The
Supremacy Clause dictates that where there is an actual conflict between state
and federal law, the state law must yield. In addition, Congress can legislate in
an area so pervasively that the Court infers the Federal Government has chosen
to "occupy the field," thus displacing any state law.
132. Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 198.
133. Id. at 194-95.
134. Id. at 194-95.
135. 477 U.S. 1 (1986).
136. Id. at 3.
137. Id. at 4.
138. Id. at 3-4.
139. Id. at 4-5.
140. Wardair Canada, Inc., 477 U.S. at 5-6.
141. Id. at 5.
142. Id. at 12-13.
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In the instant case, the Court acknowledged Congress had, through the
Federal Aviation Act, regulated extensively in the field of aviation. 43 While
there was no actual conflict, Wardair argued this Act provided evidence Congress
had regulated the field so pervasively as to preempt the state's regulation of
aviation." However, the Court emphasized that state law is not preempted
"whenever there is any federal regulation of an area of law."' 4  As now,
where there is extensive regulation by Congress, the fundamental inquiry in
Supremacy Clause analysis is "whether Congress intended to displace state
law."' A viewing of section 1513 of the Federal Aviation Act provides that
"sales or use taxes on the sale of goods or services" are permissible. 47 The
Court found this language of the Federal Aviation Act dispositive, expressly
allowing Florida to impose its excise tax on fuel. 48  Moreover, the Court
inferred that Congress had considered the issue of state taxation of air commerce
and by the language of section 1513, had-not preempted state law.' 49 'Thus,
not only had the Act not preempted the field, it had in fact expressly allowed the
states to impose excise taxes on fuel. 50 It should be noted that the-Court
applies Dormant Commerce Clause analysis only where the Federal Government
has not affirmatively acted. While the Court's finding that Congress had
expressly permitted the Florida tax may seem dispositive of the Dormant
Commerce Clause analysis, the Court nevertheless continued with a quasi-
dormant analysis, finding it "plausible" that Congress "never considered whether
[s]tates should be permitted to impose sales taxes on foreign, as opposed to
domestic, carriers . . .
In turning to its analysis, Wardair conceded that the Florida tax fulfilled the
first four requirements of the Dormant Commerce Clause tests under Complete
Auto.'52 Likewise, Wardair recognized the first prong of Japan Line was
satisfied. Since the tax was imposed upon on one discrete transaction, it
followed that there was no threat of multiple taxation.
15
Wardair's principle argument, as joined by the Solicitor General as amicus
curae, argued the Florida tax inhibited the Federal Government from "speaking
with one voice" in the area of foreign commerce."M With respect to this
second prong of the Japan Line analysis, Wardair maintained that there existed
a clear federal policy of reciprocal tax exemptions for instrumentalities of
international air traffic. 55 Wardair submitted in support of its argument: (1)
143. Id. at 6.
144. Id. at 5-6.
145. Wardair Canada, Inc., 477 U.S. at 6 (emphasis added).
146. Id
147. 49 U.S.C. § 1513 (1982).
148. Wardair Canada, Inc., 477 U.S. at 7.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 6.
151. Id. at 7.
152. Wardair Canada, Inc., 477 U.S. at 8-9.
153. Id. at 9.
154. Id at 9-10.
155. Id at 9.
[Vol. 2:345
INTERNATIONAL DOUBLE TAXATION
the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago Conven-
tion); 56 (2) a Resolution (Resolution) adopted by the International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO);55 and (3) more than seventy bilateral agree-
ments dealing with international aviation, in which the United States was a party
with several different countries.
5 1
The Court rejected this argument, pointing out that instead of bolstering
Wardair's position, this evidence in fact proved the Federal Government had
permitted state taxation of this type. The Court stated what these documents
show is "that while there appears to be an international aspiration on the one
hand to eliminate all impediments to foreign air travel-including taxation of
fuel-the law as it presently stands acquiesces in taxation of the sale of that fuel
9,159
In addressing Wardair's first evidence, the Court pointed to the terms of
Article 24(a) of the Chicago Convention." This provision only precluded the
imposition of taxes on fuel brought on board into the state. The Court reasoned
the "negative implication" of this provision provided evidence of a decision of
the contracting parties not to limit the state's power to tax."'
Next, the Court turned to what Wardair deemed its second manifestation of
federal policy. To be sure, the Resolution unequivocally supported an
international scheme by which fuel would be exempt from all taxes levied by
any taxing authority within the state. However, the Court summarily dismissed
the Resolution. Pointing out that the ICAO was merely an organization of which
the United States was a member by virtue of its participation in the Chicago
Convention, the Court emphasized that the Resolution was the policy of the
organization rather than of the United States.'62 Equally important in the
Court's analysis was the fact that neither the Executive branch nor the
Legislative branch had endorsed the Resolution. Consequently, the Resolution
lacked the force of law.'63
With respect to the bilateral aviation agreements, the Court was unwilling
to find a federal policy which would deny the state's power to tax. Rather, the
Court determined the agreements represented a policy choice of the parties to
implicitly preserve the state's power to tax aviation fuel. In reaching this
conclusion, the Court noted that in none of the seventy agreements had the
United States denied this power to the states. As with the Chicago Convention,
the Court resolved the issue by its "negative implication" analysis. Since none
of the agreements specifically denied the state's right to tax, the Court inferred
156. Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1994,61 Stat. 1180, 15 U.N.T.S. 295 [hereinafter
Chicago Convention].
157. ICAO's Policies on Taxation in the Field of International Air Transport, ICAO Doc. 8632C/968 (Nov.
1966).
158. 49 U.S.C. § 1502(a) (1982).
159. Wardair Canada, Inc., 447 U.S. at 10.
160. Chicago Convention, supra note 156, art. 24(a).
161. Wardair Canada, Inc., 447 U.S. at 10.
162. Id. at 10-11.
163. Id. at 11.
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the United States had, at the very least, acquiesced in state taxation of fuel used
by foreign carriers in international 
travel.
e
The Court concluded that the Federal Government had not remained silent.
"It would turn Dormant Commerce Clause analysis upside down to apply it
where the Federal Government has acted and to apply it in such a way as to
reverse the policy that the Federal Government has elected to follow."' In
the Court's view, the facts and circumstances of the case suggested the Federal
Government had affirmatively decided, albeit by "negative implication," to allow
state taxation of aviation fuel. As a result, the Court found that it should not
apply dormant analysis.
IV A RETURN TO CONTAINER CORP., BARCLAYS BANK V. FRANCHISE TAX BD.
OF CALIFORNIA
A. The Facts
Barclays Bank PLC (Barclays) is a United Kingdom corporation in the
Barclays Group, a multinational banking enterprise. Barclays Bank International
Limited (BBI) is the subsidiary of Barclays Bank PLC. Barclays Bank of
California (Barcal) is a wholly owned subsidiary of BBI. Only two of Barclays
Bank PLC's two hundred twenty subsidiaries are incorporated in the United
States (specifically, Barcal and Barclays Bank of New York). The Barclays
Group conducted over ninety-eight percent of its business outside the United
States."6 During the years in question, Barcal and BBI reported income as a
unitary business to the Franchise Tax Board of California. However, Barcal and
BBI did not report any of the income of the parent corporation, nor did it report
any income of the parent company's subsidiaries. The Tax Board determined
that Barcal and BBI were part of a worldwide unitary group, therefore, it
assessed an additional $154,098 tax liability, based upon the total apportioned
income of the Barclays Group. 67
Barcal and BBI prevailed in the Superior Court of Sacramento County,
which held California's method of apportionment violated the Foreign Commerce
Clause.1 6' The Court of Appeal affirmed, reasoning the application of WWCR
to a foreign parent multinational involved "foreign policy issues that must be left
to the [F]ederal [G]overnment,"' 169 and the tax was inconsistent with respect to
the executive policy that had "qualified as a source of the 'clear federal
directive.' ' '. 7  The California Supreme Court granted review, superseding the
opinion of the Court of Appeal.
164. Id. at 11-12.
165. Id. at 12.
166. Brief of Petitioner at 3, Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd. of California, - U.S. - 114
S. Ct. 2268 (1994) (No. 92-1384).
167. Barclays Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 2274.
168. Barclays Bank Int'l, Ltd. v. Franchise Tax Bd., Superior Court of Sacramento County, 232 Cal. App.
3d 1187 (1990), rev'd, 829 P.2d 279 (Cal. 1992), affid on reh'g, 10 Cal. App. 4th 1742 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992),
aff'd on other grounds, - U.S. , 114 S. Ct. 2268 (1994).
169. Barclays Bank Int'l, Ltd.. 829 P.2d at 280-81.
170. Id. at 281, 289-90.
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The California Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeal. Having noted
the court was presented with the issue left open in Container Corp., (whether
formula apportionment as applied to a foreign rather than a domestic corporation
violates the Constitution), it examined the competing methods of taxation
(WWCR and AL/SA). The court concluded that the Supreme Court of the
United States had delineated no particular mandate of methodology to withstand
Commerce or Due Process Clause scrutiny. Accordingly, the California Supreme
Court determined the apportionment formula carried out by the Tax Board
constitutionally viable.
Additionally, the California Supreme Court examined Barclays' claim of a
Dormant Foreign Commerce Clause violation. In rejecting Barclays' position,
the court relied upon Wardair.172 The court reasoned that dormant analysis was
unnecessary, stating that Congress had by "negative implication" remained silent
with respect to the states' taxation schemes. 7 1 In so concluding, the California
Supreme Court held that the tax did not proscribe the Federal Government's
ability to "speak with one voice." 74 The Court of Appeal struck down the
California scheme on dormant analysis before reaching Barclays' Due Process
and nondiscrimination issues in the prior decision. Consequently, the California
Supreme Court remanded the case for further development on Barclays' assertion
that the compliance burden on foreign-based multinational corporations violated
both the nondiscrimination requirements of the Commerce Clause and the Due
Process Clause.
The California Court of Appeal then held California's unitary tax method
of worldwide combined reporting did not violate the nondiscrimination
component of Dormant Commerce Clause. Barclays' greater administrative costs
alone, the court determined, were insufficient to support a discrimination
claim. 175  Moreover, the court found these compliance costs were neither
unreasonable, undue, or arbitrary, nor were the compliance standards without
reasonable and adequate enforcement standards.'76 Thus, the court held these
standards did not violate Due Process. 77 Barclays appealed and the California
Supreme Court denied review. The case went before the Supreme Court of the
United States upon writ of certiorari.
B. The Supreme Court Decision
78
The Supreme Court ruled, seven to two, that California's unitary taxing
scheme of worldwide combined reporting violated neither the Foreign Commerce
Clause nor the Due Process Clause of the Constitution as applied to Barclays, a
foreign corporation with foreign parents. The Court was unanimous in
reaffirming their opinion in Container Corp., where the Court determined the
171. Id. at 285-86.
172. Id. at 292-93.
173. Id. at 294-95.
174. Barclays Bank Int'l, Ltd., 829 P.2d at 292-93, 300.
175. Barclays Bank Int'l Ltd., 10 Cal. App. 4th at 1753.
176. Id. at 1757-61.
177. Id at 1767.
178. Barclays Bank PLC, 114 S. Ct. at 2268.
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unitary tax method is constitutional as applied to a domestic corporation with
foreign subsidiaries.' With respect to the foreign parent issue, the Court felt
it necessary to delve into its analysis of Container Corp. to resolve those
questions that it had left unanswered.'
For purposes of litigation, Barclays conceded that it was part of the Barclays
Group and thus formed a worldwide unitary business.' The Court then began
its analysis with an examination of the rules of law established in its Due
Process and Commerce Clause jurisprudence. The Court first noted that not only
did the Commerce Clause give Congress the power to regulate interstate
commerce, but also that it provided interstate commerce protection from state
legislation in areas where Congress had not legislated.'82 However, the Court
recognized that the Commerce Clause did not preclude the states from
extrapolating a "fair share" of its tax burden from corporations doing business
within its borders.18 3
The Court then referred to its decision in Complete Auto.' As previous-
ly noted, Complete Auto dictates that where Congress has not approved a state
tax on commerce, the tax will not be held Constitutionally viable if the taxpayer
can prove either the tax: (1) applies to an activity lacking a substantial nexus
to the taxing State; (2) is not fairly apportioned; (3) discriminates against
interstate commerce; or (4) is not fairly related to the services provided by the
State. 8 5  The Court then confirmed that, because of "the special need for
federal uniformity"'86 with respect to foreign commerce, the tax must also pass
the Container Corp. two-prong test. 7 The Court summarily dismissed three
of the four Complete Auto requirements, stating that California's worldwide
combined reporting system easily met all but the anti-discrimination require-
ment.
88
Barclays contended the compliance burdens of California's WWCR scheme
were cost prohibitive and discriminatory. It pointed out that foreign corporations
must convert their accounting records into the accounting principles of the
United States to comply with WWCR, while domestic corporations did not face
this prohibitively expensive process. More specifically, it pointed to the trial
court's estimate of establishing and maintaining a system capable of converting
its records to the WWCR standards. 189 The trial court found Barclays would
179. Id. at 2285-87.
180. Id. at 2271.
181. Id. at 2274-75.
182. ld. at 2276 (quoting Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 769 (1945)); see
also South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Brothers, Inc., 303 U.S. 177 (1938).
183. Barclays Bank PLC, 114 S. Ct. at 2276 (quoting Dep't of Revenue, Washington v. Association of
Washington Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. 734, 750 (1978)).
184. Id. at 2276-77.
185. Id. at 2276 (quoting Complete Auto Transit, Inc., 430 U.S. at 279).
186. Wardair Canada, Inc., 477 U.S. at 8.
187. Barclays Bank PLC, 114 S. Ct. at 2276.
188. Id. at 2276-77.
189. Id. at 2277.
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expend $5,000,000 to establish and over $2,000,000 annually to maintain the
records.'90
The Court responded that indeed, disproportionate compliance burdens may
be inconsistent with the Commerce Clause."' However, the Court discounted
Barclays discrimination contention. California's regulations provide the Tax
Board the discretion to allow "reasonable approximations" of the corporations
accounting records based upon the "effort and expense required to obtain the
necessary information."" With these approximations, Barclays actual cost of
compliance just before the years at issue here ranged from $900 to $1,250 per
annum.' 9 The Court relied upon this "reasonable approximations" provision,
and concluded that the taxing system had not imposed an "inordinate"
compliance burden on Barclays. 9'
Barclays then asserted that the grant of "standardless discretion" trans-
gressed due process, and that there were no standards by which to determine
what approximations would be accepted. The Court reasoned along the same
lines, pointing out that "California's judiciary had construed the California law
to curtail the discretion of California tax officials."' 95 Viewed in this light, the
Court held due process had not been violated. 9
6
The Court then examined the first of the two additional considerations set
forth in Container Corp.. This first consideration is "the enhanced risk of
multiple taxation."' 97  Barclays maintained that foreign multinationals were
exposed to a "'more aggravated' risk ... of double taxation.' 98  Barclays
emphasized, and the Court conceded, that foreign multinationals typically
maintain more of its businesses outside the confines of the United States as
compared to domestic multinationals. Thus, foreign sovereigns have already
taxed a large portion of this income. Based upon this fact, Barclays concluded
that "the breadth of double taxation and the degree of burden on foreign
commerce are greater than in the case of domestic multinationals."' 99
The Court rejected this argument, responding that multiple taxation of a
domestic corporation had indeed occurred in Container Corp. The Court
reasoned that its analysis in Container Corp. was not diminished when applied
to a foreign entity." ° In Container Corp., the Court based its holding upon
two qualifications. First, the California tax did not inevitably result in double
taxation, and second, adopting another method of taxation could not eliminate
the risk of double taxation. The Court found this rationale applicable here as
well. The Court determined California's tax would not inevitably result in
190. Id. at 2277 n.ll.
191. Id. at 2277; see e.g., Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 350-51
(1977).
192. Barclays Bank PLC, 114 S. Ct. at 2278; CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE, § 25137-6(e)(1) (West 1985).
193. Barclays Bank PLC, 114 S. Ct. at 2278 n.13.
194. Id at 2278.
195. Id. at 2278; see Barclays Bank Int'l, Ltd., 10 Cal. App. 4th at 1762.
196. Barclays Bank PLC, 114 S. Ct. at 2278-79.
197. Id. at 2279.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 2280.
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double taxation, since that result would "depend upon the facts of the individual
case." '' Moreover, the Court adopted its analysis in Container Corp., refusing
"to require California to give up one allocation method that sometimes results
in double taxation in favor of another allocation method that also sometimes
results in double taxation.
The Court then directed the largest part of the analysis to the argument
"most energetically presented" by Barclays.20 3  The argument was whether
California's taxing method "impairs federal uniformity in an area where federal
uniformity is essential." More specifically, does the method "preven[t] the
Federal government from 'speaking with one voice' in international trade"?2' 4
The Court principally relied upon its decisions in Container Corp. and
Wardair. 5 The Court first underscored that Congress may passively indicate
that state practices do not impair federal uniformity, and second, that Congress
"need not convey its intent with the unmistakable clarity required to permit state
regulation that discriminates against interstate commerce or otherwise falls short
under Complete Auto inspection."2 °6
As with Wardair and Container Corp., the Court found that Congress had
not specifically indicated any intent to preclude California from imposing its
taxing method. It observed that in the years both before and after Container
Corp., Congress had failed to enact any legislation precluding a state from taxing
corporate income based on the worldwide combined reporting method. This was
despite the fact that Congress was fully aware of the foreign sovereign's
objection to California's reporting requirement.2 7
Equally important, the Court found its prior analysis of Senate action on a
United States/United Kingdom treaty particularly enlightening. The Senate
refused to ratify this tax treaty while it contained a provision banning Califor-
nia's taxing scheme. After this provision had been specifically reserved as
inapplicable to the states, the Senate then ratified the agreement. The Court
stated this action "reinforces our conclusion that Congress has implicitly
permitted the States to use the worldwide combined reporting method., 208 The
Court viewed this legislation, or with respect to the former the lack thereof, as
an indication that Congress had permitted the states' practice of worldwide
combined reporting. Therefore, Barclays' objection to California's method was
"directed to the wrong forum."'  Thus, the Court once again reiterated it is
Congress, not the judiciary, with whom the duty lies to determine federal policy.
201. Barclays Bank PLC, 114 S. Ct. at 2280.
202. Id. (quoting Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 193).
203. Id. at 2281.
204. Id. (quoting Japan Line, Ltd., 441 U.S. at 448, 453 (quoting Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S.
at 285)).
205. d at 2281-86.
206. Barclays Bank PLC, 114 S. Ct. at 2282-88.
207. Id. at 2283.
208. Id. at 2284.




Despite the state's power to collect an equitable amount of tax revenue from
corporations doing business within its borders, a strong argument can be made
that the WWCR method extrapolates a disproportionate amount of tax from
international business. The Court in Container Corp. expressly declined to
decide if California's tax would withstand Japan Line's two-prong test as applied
to a foreign multinational, even though the same tax might be constitutional as
applied to a domestic corporation. As noted previously, the Barclays Group
conducted over ninety-eight percent of its business outside the United States.
California was successful in obtaining an additional $154,098.00 in tax liability
for a total of $709,822.00. While noting the broader protection of foreign
commerce, the Court failed to extend the exacting scrutiny required of dormant
foreign commerce analysis. In the first instance, the language of Japan
Line, modified in Container Corp., provides that a state's tax will not survive
Constitutional scrutiny if the tax creates "an enhanced risk of multiple taxation."
Nevertheless, the Court reasoned that multiple taxation would not inevitably
result because multiple taxation would depend upon the facts of each case. But
what the Court failed to do was apply the express language of the test. It is the
risk of multiple taxation that will strike down the tax, not that the tax will
inevitably result in multiple taxation. If the test is viewed with the exacting
scrutiny expected from the High Court, in an international context this risk is
apparent.
Because California's method is incommensurate with the method the world
community employs, the risk is that multiple taxation will occur. This stems
from the fact that three factors used by California assign a higher proportion of
income to California. However, the formula apportions a lower proportion of
income to the jurisdiction outside California. Since the factors used to calculate
the income in California are higher and the foreign sovereign has already taxed
this income using the arm's length method, the corporation's income is exposed
to the risk multiple taxation.
In reaching its decision, the Court refused to evaluate WWCR on its own
merits. The Court also refused to adopt the lesser of two evils and allow the
marketplace to adjust to any distortions of the alternate taxing schemes. If states
were required to adopt the arm's length method with respect to foreign
corporations, any resultant multiple taxation could be cured through compromise
and negotiation with the parties involved. However, the Court effectively
dodged the obvious ramifications of its holding by the unsound reasoning of
Congress' "negative implication." With the "negative implication" standard, the
Court broke from its prior settled jurisprudence that required the intent of the
Federal Government to permit state activity be necessarily "unmistakably
clear."2 ° It seems clear that the affirmative approval in the instant case had
not been acquired. Therefore, the net effect of the Court's decision is to allow
the states to escape the reach of the Dormant Foreign Commerce Clause and has
210. South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 91 (1984).
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confirmed a more congenial approach to Dormant Commerce Clause analysis in
favor of the states.
The effect of the Court's decision is to favor revenue starved states at the
cost of the economic development of the country as a whole. First, the Court
failed to consider that a foreign corporation will be less apt to invest in the
United States due to less uniform application by the states of formula apportion-
ment. As a practical matter, the states will be able apply their formula
apportionment methods with fewer uniform standards. This follows from the
Court's liberal treatment of the state's methods of taxing income, which places
multinationals at a competitive disadvantage. Second, retaliatory legislation by
foreign governments is likely to follow the Barclays Bank decision. This
retaliation will disrupt foreign policy negotiations at the cost of the nation as a
whole. In today's volatile economic climate, with all of the discussion centering
around removing barriers to international trade and investment, this decision
seems to be a step in the wrong direction. Accordingly, Congress did not "at
least acquiesce" by "negative implication" in the state's use of formula
apportionment as applied to a foreign multinational corporation.
The foreign multinational corporations are both sensitive and responsive to
tax effects. They will undoubtedly consider the ramifications of formula
apportionment. If the multinational corporation finds that formula apportionment
disallows a reasonable return on their investment, the result will be a shift in
investment and income from the United States to foreign sources. Moreover, the
multinational corporations may alter the form of their companies into passive
investments to circumvent being classified as a unitary business. While this may
seem insignificant, valuable economies of scale and specialized expertise will be
lost. The effect of these losses could result in lower tax bases and thus lower
tax revenues for the state and the United States as a whole.
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